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Introduction
On 1 December 1965 the University of Michigan submitted to NASA a
proposal for research on probabilistic information processing. Work actually
began on 15 June 1967; funding was $80,000 on that date; $80,000 on 1 July 1968;
$80,000 (step-funding) on 1 July 1969; and $75,000 (extension of step-funding)
on 1 July 1969. The step-funding ran out on 30 June 1972. This is the final
report of the program of research. It covers work done between 15 June 1967 and
30 June 1972. The first section contains a general summary of the changes in
our thinking that occurred as a result of our basic and applied research. The
second section presents a detailed account of what we promised to do, as con-
tained in our proposals, and what came out of those promises. The third section
details those products delivered that had not been promised. The final section
contains a documentation of the articles and reports emanating from this research
effort along with abstracts summarizing research results.
One comment is perhaps worth making about the program as a whole before
proceeding to the body of the report. Originally, our intention had been to
perform work of direct significance to the function of the Mission Operations
Control Room in connection with manned space flight missions. We are somewhat
unclear about the degree to which our work in fact had such directly NASA-relevant
impact. But the^ideas generated during the program have had meaningful impact on
other non-NASA U.S. government activities. The general idea of probabilistic in-
formation processing, brought from a gleam in the eye to a feasible technology in
the course of this program, is now routinely applied by the Defense Intelligence
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Agency and other organizations in the U.S. intelligence community. Multi- ;>
attribute utility measurement, using technology developed in this program, is
now in use as a program planning tool in the Office of Child Development, DHEW,
and is likely to spread to other program planning and evaluation activities.
While these are the most important impacts on government programs, other less
direct ones can easily be traced.
This is one "applications-oriented program" that really did produce
applications.
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Section I
i
In 1966 EPL was concerned with two specific questions. One was, "what
is the locus of conservatism?" The second was, "is PIP a better information
processing system than existing systems?" We asked these questions as part of
our ongoing attempt to identify those aspects of the environment that affect
the way people process information and to determine those properties of the
individual that account for his inability to extract the proper amount of
information from data. We could ask these questions because we had an appro-
priate methodology including specifiable data generating processes that could
be implemented.
Our concern with understanding both the environment and the characteristics
of the information processor has been motivated by the realization that the more
we know about information processing, the better our chance of improving it. Thus,
even while we did primarily basic research within controlled laboratory environments
we never felt that the issues we addressed should be investigated for only academic
reasons. If our research product could not lead toward better information pro-
cessing systems or better decisions, then we should be doing something else. In
1966, we felt that we were ready to test the PIP ideas in real world situations.
Consequently, we came to NASA searching for contexts where we could implement PIP
on-line.
However, how should we test out PIP? We expected PIP to do at least as
well as any other system at all times and better than other systems in situations
having an intermediate level of uncertainty. If there is very little uncertainty,
almost any system should be correct. If there is great uncertainty, there may>:~be
no btt§1§ for any system to reach an appropriate conclusion. Consequently, we heeded
to find situations with some uncertainty, but not too much. PIP should also be,,,
better in situations where a great deal of data must be processed including those
data of minimal diagnostic value that are otherwise frequently overlooked. There-
fore, we hoped to find situations where there was a lot of slightly diagnostic data.
Before we could test PIP to see if it was better than its alternatives, we
needed to define the concept "better." We have spent considerable time and effort
oh this non-trivial problem, and have concluded that many operational definitions
are appropriate. If the data-generating process is well-defined, then probabilities
calculated by means of it can be compared directly with those calculated from
human estimates. If the data-generating process is not known but the correct
hypothesis is known, then probability estimates can be evaluated (over an ensemble
of such Instances) by means of what are called proper scoring rules. If neither
the data-generating process nor the correct hypothesis is known, then analogy
from laboratory experiments with known data-generating processes suggests the idea
that more extreme probability distributions are more nearly correct than less
extreme ones. (Obviously this last idea must be handled with care. The n-th
power of a probability distribution, renormalized, is also interpretable as a
probability distribution—more extreme than the first power, if n is greater than
1. Distributions can be too extreme as well as too flat, though extremeness is
clearly preferable to flatness whenever the data justify it. Analogy from ex-
periments with known data-generating processes suggests that PIP is unlikely to
be too extreme.) From a different point of view, a "better" system is one which
the users find more acceptable.
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For each of these definitions of "better" statistical problems
arise in measuring deviations from optimality or in comparing one system with
another, and In aggregating such measures over situations, systems, subjects,
and data within a situation. We have worked out approaches to these problems
for each of the definitions of "better" we considered.
Before PIP could be put to any test at NASA or anywhere else, implemen-
tation problems had to be solved. This need dictated a new orientation of our
basic research program. Response modes, display and training questions, and the
problems of how to handle conditionally dependent data and nonstationary hypothesis
situations were studied. Experiments were conducted in whtch subjects used either
a verbal response mode or recorded their responses on logarithmically spaced
scales. An experiment was run comparing the effects on LR estimation of the
feedback from a display showing the posterior probability distribution implied
by a given set of LRs (likelihood ratios) for a particular datum to LR estima-
tion where there was no visual display as feedback. We carried out experiments
in which subjects estimated LRs and revised their odds for both conditionally
dependent and conditionally independent data. Other experiments compared odds
estimation in both cascaded and noncascaded hypothesis situations. We ran
an experiment to determine whether people respond appropriately to nonstationary
environments.
As the same time that this basic research program was undertaken we were
searching for contexts within Mission Control where we could implement and test
PIP on-line. However, it became apparent that MSC was not the place to test these
ideas for two main reasons. First of all, mission controllers do not deal with
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much irreducible uncertainty and consequently all rational systems should lead
to the same conclusions. Secondly, mission controllers deal with a very rich?ci::!
hypothesis space. In situations like this where so many hypotheses are being,^
considered simultaneously, the cost in time and effort of getting all the necessary
inputs would probably exceed any potential gain of this system over the existing
one.
While we did hot find that MSC offered a good test of PIP, we came to
believe that MSC might provide a good opportunity to test other aspects of decision
analysis technology. It appeared to us that the formulation of Mission Rules
might be helped by means of decision analysis, since such rules are essentially
pre-specified decisions.
Therefore we set out to study other aspects of decision analysis, especially
the measurement of value or utility. In particular we wanted a method of validating
utility judgments comparable to the known-data-generating-process case for pro-
babilities. Knowing the "right answer" would enable us to use departure from
optimality as the criterion by which to evaluate performance. We have not yet
succeeded in implementing a known utility approach. We found that existing en-
vironmental models that we examined were too complex. Furthermore, the laboratory
models that we devised could not be realistic, camouflaged and evaluateable simul-
taneously. Therefore we tried a different approach. We tested experimentally
both in the laboratory and in the field the feasibility of the Weighted Linear
Average (WLA) Model. We used as a criterion the predictability of choices after
extended learning based on aggregated judgments from choices based on decomposed
judgments. In undertaking both the laboratory and the on-line studies we found
- 7 -
ourselves faced with new response mode, training and display problems that needed
solutions. We considered different methods of dealing with interdimensional
incomparability. One method is to compare every dimension with a single dimension
such as money or time saved. Another method involves constructing appropriate
lotteries and determining relative preferences for these lotteries.. We~used
several procedures, including direct-rating techniques with normalized /and un-
normalized quantities, to elicit assessments of the relative weights for the dif-
ferent dimensions of a multi-attributed object. We tried different schemes for
defining the end points of the scales. In one scheme the end points of the in-
dividual scales were marked with ambiguous descriptions such as very important vs.
not important. In other studies the end points were designated by the extremes of
the dimension that had some realistic probability of occurring. This technology
however is still in the very beginning stages of development.
Our laboratory and field activities have led to some conclusions, and.also
to some rather important non-NASA applications.
One important conclusion is that probabilistic information processing systems
can be implemented and do work. We initially were much concerned about response
modes, nonstationarity, violations of conditional independence, and training. But
all of these problems seem soluable, and in fact have been solved in applications
of Bayesian information processing to intelligence system data.
Our conclusions about conservatism complicate the picture somewhat. The
Wheeler thesis, a NASA-sponsored product, shows that in laboratory situations mis-
aggregation lies behind the phenomenon of conservatism. This finding seems to
bring the abstract laboratory question to a natural termination, and we do not
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anticipate doing any more such studies. But what does this mean for real-world
probabilistic information processing? £c-
Two practical facts of life intervene at this point. One is that most
 :
real world information processors are inexperienced with expressing uncertainties
as probabilities. To introduce the rather indirect reasoning implicit in a PIP
system to such people all at once is too much. First they must come to regard
uncertainty as naturally and properly measured by probability—and this is in
itself a major and prolonged educational problem. After that, it remains the
case that, as our NASA research shows, feedback from a Bayesian system to the
estimators of quantities to go into it will seriously degrade the system—and
yet such feedback is imperative in practice if the operators are to be willing
to use and trust the system. For these reasons, we anticipate that the full-
dress probabilistic information processing systems originally envisaged will
develop only gradually, emerging from difficulties with direct estimation of
probabilities. Indeed, some response modes so blur the distinction between PIP
systems and direct estimatesrof posterior probabilities that it becomes rather
difficult to decide which system is which.
Are such systems conservative? We don't know, but suspect so. Does that
conservatism impair their performance? Probably. Are such effects eventually
reflected in sub=optimal decisions? We don't know. But such questions must
finally be looked at in real systems, not only in the laboratory, though relevant
laboratory work remains to be done.
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The next major topic in research on decision analysis seems to us to be
the structuring of the decision problem. The formal structure of decision analysis
is well-defined; various appropriate response modes exist; elicitation and
training procedures have been studied at least in part. A look into the shape
of decision-theoretical maxima has been very enlightening to us. Unless the
problem has unusual asymmetries in payoffs or probabilities, substantial departures
from optimal strategy produce only small percentage reductions in expected value
of the act chosen. This general insensitivity implies that response modes and
training procedures are less important than we used to think they are. But decision
analyses are extremely sensitive to the basic framework used. Addition of one
more act, consideration of one more state, concern about one more dimension of
value—all of these can utterly change an analysis. How can the*.basic framework
of a decision analysis be studied as a scientific topic? A NASA-sponsored doctoral
dissertation on the structuring of hierarchical inference systems has provided us
with a small piece of the answer by showing how such systems can be structured,
and how the structure influences the system's behavior. But the surface of this
topic is only scratched.
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Section II
The research program that was completed at EPL under NASA sponsorship
can be arbitrarily divided into the following four categories: Research in
the MSC Setting, Laboratory research on PIP, Research on multi-attribute
utilities, and Small scale Bayesian research.
1. Research in the MSC Setting
In the 1966 proposal it was stated that the goal of our on-site research
efforts would be to prepare a document showing in detail how PIP could be
applied in the NASA context. However, before this could be done, EPL personnel
would have to familiarize themselves with NASA command problems and settings
by reading documents and by visiting NASA facilities.
EPL personnel visited MSC and read scores of documents. The result of
this effort was a realization that PIP per se was not a useful system for MSC
mainly because mission controllers do not deal with very much irreducible
uncertainty and secondly because they do deal with a very large set of hypo-
theses. The first reason means that PIP does not have much to offer over
existing systems. The implication of the second reason is that using PIP would
'be too costly in time and effort. Consequently, our emphasis shifted away from
an exploration of the usefulness of PIP to an exploration of the usefulness of
decision analysis. The 1968 and 1969 proposals reflected this change.
In 1968 and 1969 we proposed to explore the possibility that explicit
estimation of probabilities and values is useful as a basis for writing mission
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rules. More specifically, we suggested that whenever the formulation of a
mission rule was both difficult and important enough to warrant a formal pro-
cedure, the decision analysis, exploiting human judgment, might be a reasonable
course to pursue. The specific plan of action had three phases. During Phase 1
EPL personnel would become sufficiently familiar with the rules for some particular
mission to select a few rules that met our criteria. Phase 2 would consist of
preparing and running simulations that exercise these chosen rules. During this
phase explicit probability and value judgments would be collected. In Phase 3
new mission rules where appropriate would be written. These new rules would be
more consistent with the judged values and probabilities obtained in Phase 2
than the old rules were. Then these new mission rules would be tried out in
simulated missions. Another purpose of either Phase 2 or 3 would be to see what
effects simulation experience would have on the assessed value and probability
judgments.
In order to explore the extent to which the values and probabilities that
enter into mission rules can be made explicit test simulations were formulated
and run according to our specifications (Edwards, 1968). These studies led to
several conclusions. First, nothing in the exercises denied our premise that
every decision, including those made on-line by space vehicle controllers, depends
on subjective answers to the questions: What's at stake and what are the odds.
Second, while irreducible uncertainty plays a remarkably small role in on-line
control of space flight, value judgments play an extremely major role. Finally,
formal decision theory with its explicit use of cardinal probability and value
judgments can make a contribution to resolving difficult cases. Moreover, the
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decision theoretic approach has a great deal to offer a more highly automated
mission control system.
We had at least three objectives at MSC—to test our ideas in a real
world setting, to teach our techniques to NASA personnel, and to find relevant
problems where our technology would make a definite contribution. We were only
partially successful. We were not able to persuade MSC personnel of the value of
using -decision analysis to construct mission rules.
One of the major ramifications of our interaction with MSC was an in-
creasing awareness of the importance of developing a utility measurement tech-
nology as quickly as possible. In this spirit we proposed to NASA in 1970 to
develop such a methodology for use in solving the problems of selection, scheduling
and rescheduling of experiments. This proposal was not supported.
2. Laboratory research on PIP
Based on prior laboratory research on PIP* we believed that PIP showed
promise of being a viable diagnostic system with advantages over existing systems^
But PIP still needed the test of real world applications. However, in order to
implement a system of this kind, for test or other purposes, practical, how-to-
do-it procedures need to be established. Therefore, in 1966 we proposed the first
of a series of studies on how to best tool up a PIP system. This experiment
proposed to investigate the effects of different kinds of response modes and
displays.
The study and the data analyses were completed and the results were dis-
seminated. These results are being incorporated into a review article now in
progress (Goodman).
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In the 1968 proposal three additional studies along this same 'line were
proposed. The purpose of the first was to explore the question of whether
group discussion combined with a requirement for consensus led to essentially
the same results as averaging pre-group individual likelihood ratio (LR)
assessments. This study was done by Barbara Goodman as her doctoral dissertation
research. It has been completed and the journal article published (Goodman, 1972).
The purpose of the second experiment was to explore the differences, if any,
in LR assessment between those Ss who assess P(D|H) and are shown the LRs implied
by their estimates and those Ss who assess LRs directly and are shown the P(D|H)
values implied by their assessments. This study was not done. The most similar
study we did was a pilot study designed to see whether Ss would change their LRs
or their odds when the two sets of estimates led to different posterior odds for
the same sequences of data. The problem in doing the original study as proposed
and in our failure to draw any conclusions from the pilot study that was done has
been training. If an experimenter uses untrained subjects, then he can generalize
about the information processing ability or lack of it in the general population.
However, if one is concerned about designing information processing systems using
trained operators, then the results of these studies have their limitations.
What does a well-trained PIP operator know? What can he do? What experience has
he had?
In order to have an operable PIP system we need to resolve the question
about what to do about the absence of conditional independence in the data set.
The beginnings of an answer to this question was proposed as the third experiment
in the 1968 proposal. Its specific purpose was to investigate two particular
procedures. One procedure consists of collecting dependent data together and
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treating each set as a single datum. The other procedure consists of estimating
LRs that are conditional on preceding data.
This experiment was completed and the journal article published (Domas
 r
and Peterson, 1972).
Keeping with the spirit of "let's implement a PIP system", the 1969
proposal suggested experiments in two of the problem areas previously opened
up—training and conditional dependence of the data set.
A transfer i.of training experiment was proposed in which subjects would be
trained to estimate LRs in a system having a specifiable data generating process
partially known to the subjects. It would probably be two formal distributions
differing only in their mean values. These same subjects would then be asked
to estimate LRs in systems having DGPs both similar and dissimilar to the D6P in
the training situation.
This experiment was not done.
Beginning with the 1969 proposal, research on conditional dependence was
being viewed as part of the larger problem of cascaded or multi-stage inference.
There were two questions posed on this topic in the 1969 proposal. One was,
"how can a probability distribution over a set of data be treated as a datum?"
The other was, "is conservatism a phenomenon in a cascaded as well as a single
stage inference system, assuming the system has either a binomial or a normal
DGP?"
The first question remains unanswered. Three experiments on the second
question have been completed and the respective journal articles will appear in
a forthcoming issue of Organizational Behavior and Human Performance devoted to
this topic (Youssef and Peterson, a; Youssef and Peterson, b; and Gettys, Kelly
and Peterson.)
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In the 1970 proposal, research on PIP was concentrated on the topic of
multi-stage inference. Two main experimental tasks were suggested. One was to
uncover an explanation that predicts radicalism in multi-stage inference systems
and conservatism in single stage systems and then adequately tests out this
hypothesis. The other task was to determine what changes are required in the
technology of PIP to handle datum unreliability and hierarchical organization of
information processing.
The experiments on this topic have resulted in a much greater understanding
of this problem than we had anticipated. One doctoral dissertation has been
produced (Kelly, 1972) and two journal articles (Snapper and Fryback, 1971; Gettys,
Kelly and Peterson, in press) have been written.
3. Research on multi-attribute utility measurement (MAUM)
The 1968 proposal first called for EPL to do research on this topic. What
we outlined was a small scale laboratory study entitled "Research on the measurement
of value." We proposed to design an experiment that would explore different methods
for applying the Weighted Linear Average (WLA) Model, To evaluate the different
approaches we realized that our first task would be to define an appropriate
experimental situation having stimuli where an objective standard of correctness
of the composite exists, such as prices for used cars. Thus, in 1968 we began our
search for such an experimental situation. We are still searching.
In 1969 the general purpose of our MAUM program was to study how men make
value judgments, how they can be helped to make them better and how such judgments
could be used as inputs to decision-making systems. Specifically we proposed to
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investigate the WLA model as a model for MAUM. The first step was to define a
dependent variable; preferably, the deviations of subjects' judgments from
optimality. However, this requires that you have an official standard of
judgment, that is, a model of what we sometimes call "God's utility function."
It must have the nature of a many-to-one transformation. It must be complex
enough so that no amount of experience with its outputs would make it trans-
parent and obvious to the subjects. Furthermore, it must be reasonable and in-
tuitive so that subjects don't have too much unlearning to do. The next step
would be to train subjects to have intuitions that roughly parallel "God's
utilities." Given that we have been able to find a suitable model and have
elaborately trained our subjects, we proposed as the next step a set of ex-
periments that would enable us to begin investigating the WLA model. These
experiments would examine two necessary procedural questions—how do you elicit
single dimension value judgments from subjects and how do you elicit importance
judgments for each dimension.
A "God's utility" model incorporating all of the features that we want was
not developed. However, one study was done under NASA sponsorship that did have
many of these features and did investigate several methods for eliciting value
judgments and importance weights (von Winterfeldt, 1971).
In the 1970 proposal a multi-attribute utility measurement procedure was
proposed to handle the problems of selecting, scheduling and rescheduling ex-
periments for manned space flights. This procedure consisted of the following
steps: identifying the dimensions of value relevant to each experiment; locating
each experiment on each dimension; rescaling the dimension; judging of the
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importance of each dimension, applying the WLA equation and finally testing.
In order to develop the appropriate methodology to implement this procedure we
proposed to conduct work on the four kinds of experiments that would be needed
enroute. These were experiments on response modes, abstract validation experiments
at the individual level, less abstract validation experiments at the Individual
level, and finally explorations within the real world context.
Edwards (1970) summarizes our thinking in this area.
4. Small scale Bayesian research
In 1966 a single small scale Bayesian research study was proposed. It
was a laboratory experiment on the topic of the locus of conservatism comparing
individuals who estimated either LRs or odds in either a cumulative or non-
cumulative mode.
This experiment was done using the pick-up stick data generating process
for the first time. A journal article is in preparation (Wheeler and Edwards).
In 1968 two major categories of small scale studies were proposed in
addition to the category on value measurement which we have already included
under the multi-attribute utility measurement section. One category proposed
continued research on conservatism investigating such topics as the relative
contribution of number of data and diagnosticity of each datum to conservatism
and the confusion concerning primacy and recency effects. One experiment that
was specifically proposed was a study to test the hypothesis that it is only
with a 50-50 prior distribution that the first datum of a sequence is properly
processed. Our motivation was a desire to investigate the frequent finding that
estimation of the diagnostic value of the first datum was the Bayesian prescribed
value in spite of the fact that this assessment required an aggregation step,
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that is, combining the prior odds with the assessing of the impact of the
first datum.
This research package was.the basis for the studies done by DuCharme
as his doctoral dissertation research. An article summarizing this set of
experiments has been published (DuCharme, 1970).
The other category of research proposed in 1968 was the topic of infor-
mation purchase. Experiments were outlined concentrating on the flat maximum
problem, i.e., the problem that the expected value function is flat relative
to the independent variable being manipulated.
Several experiments on this topic were run using subjects' direct estimates
of the value of information as the dependent variable. A journal article
summarizing the results of these studies has been published (Wendt, 1969).
The 1969 proposal outlined subsequent studies under the same categories
of research detailed in 1968. More work was proposed on the topic of the locus
of conservatism. More specifically, more research was suggested to tie down
more firmly the conclusion that misaggregation is the primary cause of conser-
vatism.
The several experiments that comprise our last word (at least for awhile)
on this topic were done by Wheeler as her doctoral dissertation research (Wheeler,
1972). A journal article summarizing these studies is in preparation.
The information purchase issue that we proposed to investigate was the
change, if any, in subject's optimality as a function of the sharpness of the
function relating EV to the amount of information purchased.
This research .was completed and a journal article is in preparation
(Saltzman and Peterson).
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There were no additional small scale Bayesian research studies detailed
in the 1970 proposal. By this time we had made a commitment to spend our
energies on studying multi-attribute utilities.
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Section III
Any large scale research effort extending over a several year period
that allows for any flexibility will produce research products not promised
in any proposal. Our program has produced several of these "bonuses."
In January, 1969, Edwards prepared an updating of his 1964 bibliography
on publications on human decision processes. This new work (Edwards, 1969)
contains 1393 references.
In implementing a PIP system, one of the major problems is how to handle
a nonstationary environment. Chinnis and Peterson asked the basic question,
"can people discern when an environment has changed?" The results of this
study have been published in a journal article (Chinnis and Peterson, 1970).
One variation of the information purchase model that we have investigated
is specifically relevant to the question of how people make the tradeoff between
speed and accuracy in tasks in which time costs money. An extensive series of
experiments have been conducted on this topic. The results are published in two
journal articles, Swensson and Edwards (1971) and Swensson (1972). This latter
publication describes the research that Swensson completed for his doctoral dis-
sertation.
Wendt conducted several information purchase experiments testing the
hypothesis that it might be the discreteness of the variables of the decision
matrix that caused the conservatism found in previous studies. The results of
these studies were presented in a paper given at the 3rd Research Conference on
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Subjective Probability, Utility, and Decision Making, London, on September 7,
8, and 9, 1971 (Wendt, 1971).
Wallsten looked at the locus of conservatism question within the frame-
work of conjoint measurement theory and then related this approach to the
Bayesian scheme and the notions of misperception, misaggregatioh, and response
bias. This development and the results of an experiment to test some of the
implications of this development have been published in a journal article
(Wallsten, 1972).
Saltzman ran an experiment both to determine whether subjects are con-
servative information processors when making probability assessments over a
continuum and to investigate alternative response modes for credible intervals.
This study was completed, the data analysis finished and a draft of the journal
article prepared (Saltzman).
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Section IV
1. Edwards, W. Controller decisions in manned space flight.
In Applications of Research on Human Decision Making, Proceedings of
a symposium on Application of Research on Human Decision Making, 1968,
Washington, D. C.: NASA Scientific and Technical Information Division,
NASA-SP-209, 1970, 93-106.
This paper describes the results of two simulation studies run for
mission controllers. Four controllers were interviewed in detail after
the simulations had been run. They were asked to estimate the values and
odds bearing on each decision and, in the case in which information processing
was called for, an appropriate likelihood ratio for the datum to be processed.
When (as usually happens) some answers were inconsistent with others, the
controllers were invited to revise any or all answers in the direction of
greater consistency. The result was that all controllers did achieve essentially
consistent sets of estimates, and that in all cases the estimates predicted
the decision that was actually made. In other words, a computer, given the
same value and probability estimates that the controller had made, could have
made the same decisions.
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2. Edwards, W., Phillips, L. D., Hays, W. L. & Goodman, B. C.
Probabilistic information processing systems: Design and evaluation. IEEE
Trans. Syst. Sci. Cybernetics, 1968, 3^ 248-265.
A Probabilistic Information Processing System (PIP) uses men and
machines in a novel way to perform diagnostic information processing. Men
estimate likelihood ratios for each datum and each pair of hypotheses under
consideration (or a sufficient subset of these pairs). A computer aggregates
these estimates by means of Bayes's theorem of probability theory into a
posterior distribution that reflects the impact of all available data on all
hypotheses being considered. Such a system circumvents human conservatism
in information processing, the inability of men to aggregate information in
such a way as to modify their opinions as much as the available data justify.
It also fragments the job of evaluating diagnostic information into small,
separable tasks. The posterior distributions that are a PIP's output may
be used as a guide to human decision making, or may be combined with a payoff
matrix in order to make decisions by means of the principle of maximizing expected
value.
A large simulation-type experiment compared PIP with three other information
processing systems in a simulated strategic war setting of the 1970's. The
difference between PIP and its competitors was that in PIP the information
was aggregated by computer, while in the other three systems, the operators
aggregated the information in their heads. PIP processed the information
dramatically more efficiently than did any competitor. Data that would lead
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PIP to give 99:1 odds in favor of a hypothesis led the next best system
to give 4 1/2:1 odds.
An auxiliary experiment showed that if PIP operators are allowed
to know the current state of the system's opinions about the hypotheses it
is considering, they perform less effectively than if they do not have this
information.
This paper reports work done before the NASA program began; only
its preparation was supported by NASA.
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3. Wendt, D. Value of information for decisions, J_. Math.
Psychol., 1969, 6., 430-443.
Information that will reduce the risk of a decision may be costly
in time, effort, or money. The maximum amount that should be invested in
the information—its fair cost—depends upon payoffs, the diagnosticity of the
data source, and prior probabilities of the hypotheses. These are the
independent variables of this experiment. Subjects estimated the fair costs
by means of the Marschak bidding procedure. The subjects' bids changed
in the direction appropriate to each of the three independent variables, but
not enough to be optimal.
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4. Edwards, W. Man-machine systems for policy mediation and
intellectual control. Talk given at the Fourth Annual NASA-University
Conference on Manual Control, Ann Arbor, Michigan, March 22, 1968.
No further publication of this speech is planned.
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5. Edwards, W. A bibliography of research on behavioral decision
processes to 196jB. Human Performance Center Memorandum Report No. 7,
January 1969.
This report lists 1393 references to publications on behavioral
decision processes to 1968. It is an alphabetical listing by author and
consequently is not grouped according to any topic categorization scheme.
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6. Swensson, R. G. The elusive trade-off: speed versus accuracy
in visual discrimination tasks. Perception & Psychophysics. 1972, ]2_, 16-32.
Theoretical models for choice reaction time and discrimination under
time pressure must account for Ss1 ability to trade accuracy for increased
speed. The fast guess model views these tradeoffs as different mixtures of
"all-or-none" strategies, while incremental models assume they reflect
different degrees of thoroughness in processing the stimulus. Three experiments
sought tradeoffs for difficult visual discriminations, using explicit payoffs
to control and manipulate pressures for speed and accuracy. Although guessing
was pervasive, the simple fast guess model could be rejected; Experiments II
and III obtained tradeoffs even when fast guesses were purged from Ss1 data.
Tradeoff functions fit by several formulations revealed: a) slower rates of
increase in accuracy for more similar stimuli, and b) substantial "dead times"
(80 - 100 msec slower than detection times) before discrimination responses
could exceed chance accuracy. Errors were sometimes faster and sometimes
slower than correct responses (depending on S/s speed-accuracy trade); the
latter effect may reflect a ceiling on S/s achievable accuracy. This paper ended
with a discussion that examines the implications of the results for models of
discrimination under time pressure; it suggests modifications in present models,
focusing on the random walk model, and describes an alternative "deadline" model.
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7. Chinrris, J. R., Jr. & Peterson, C. R. Nonstatlonary
processes and conservative inference. J_. exp. Psychol., 1970, §4, 248-251.
The experiment tested the hypothesis that people are conservative
processors of fallible information because they treat stationary data-
generating processes as if they were nonstationary, i.e., subject to change
from time to time. The _Ss made inferences from fallible data when the
population from which the data were sampled could change during the sampling
process. Performance on this task was compared with performance on a similar,
but stationary task. The Ss behaved differently in the two situations,
appropriately assuming zero probability of change only in the stationary task.
In addition, the pattern of conservatism in the two tasks requires rejection
of the hypothesis that conservatism is due to inappropriate assumptions
of nonstationarity.
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8. DuCharme, W. M. Response bias explanation of conservative
human inference. JL exp. Psycho!., 1970, 85, 66-74.
Conservative human inference has been attributed to misperception or
misaggregation of data, but it may be caused by response biases. In the
present experiments, Ss revised odds estimates about which one of two normal
distribution data generators was being sampled. An analysis of special
sequences and a plot of revised odds against theoretical odds in Exp. I
showed a bias in Ss' response functions. They revised odds optimally only
over a range of +^1.0 log odds. When E_ set different levels of prior odds,
the response functions shifted so that the optimal range centered around
the set prior odds. A second experiment showed that the biased functions
remained invariate over changes in data generator familiarity and diagnosticity.
Of the several explanations offered for these response functions, an odds
bias seems the most likely. Whatever the cause of the bias, Ss neither
misaggregated nor misperceived data within their optimal range.
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9. Goodman, B. C. Action selection and likelihood ratio estimates
by individuals and groups. Organizational Behavior and Human Performance,
1972, 7_, 121-141.
This study investigated the shifts between individual and group
performance in a choice dilemma, a gambling, and a Bayesian likelihood ratio
estimation task. Twenty seven male subjects performed each task alone. Six
four-man leaderless groups were formed and repeated the each task. Three
subjects performed the task alone a second time. Finally, all 27 subjects
repeated each task again alone. The choice dilemma task decisions reproduced
previously found patterns of shifts. Groups preferred higher variance gambles
than did the average of pregroup individuals. The post-group likelihood ratio
estimates of 22 of the 24 test subjects resembled their group's estimates
more closely than they resembled their own pregroup estimates. Both group
and individual correlations between measures of performance in all three
tasks were low.
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10. Snapper, K. J. & Fryback, D. G. Inferences based on
unreliable reports. J_. exp. Psyehol., 1971, 87_, 401-404.
Inferences may be based on direct observation of events or on reports
from indirect sources about the occurrence of events. A direct observation
will be more diagnostic than a report if the source of the report is not
completely reliable. Previous studies have investigated Ss1 inferences based
on either directly observed events or completely reliable reports. This
study investigated Ss1 inferences based on partially reliable reports. The
Ss responded to reduced report reliability by using a formally inappropriate
rule that led to overestimation of the diagnostic impact of a report.
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11. Swensson, R. G. & Edwards, W. Response strategies in a
two-choice reaction task with a continuous cost for time. J. exp. Psycho!.,
1971, 88, 67-81.
Each trial of a two-choice task rewarded" S_ for a correct response
but charged a cost proportional to his response time. Seven of the eight
Ss in three experiment violated predictions of the random-walk model and
confirmed those of the fast-guess model by using only two response strategies
in all conditions. These Ss either responsed accurately or made a detection
response when the stimulus appeared, accepting chance-level error rates to
respond 15-20 or 45-70 msec, faster (for two different types of stimuli).
Stimulus frequency and payoffs primarily determined which strategy S^would
adopt. Data were ambiguous for only one S^ equally well fit by the random-walk
model and by assuming that he intermittently guessed on some proportion of
f
trials.
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12. Wendt, D. Use of information in a risky market situation.
Paper presented at 3rd Research Conference on Subjective Probability, Utility,
and Decision Making, London, Sept. 7, 8, 9, 1971.
A series of experiments investigated purchase decisions of Ss in the
role of a retailer in a risky market situation. To aid their choice of a
quantity to be bought, they had tables indicating their payoff for all possible
combinations of amount bought and amount vendible, and information from a data
source correlated to the amount vendible (state of nature). Results showed
that Ss were sensitive to the diagnosticity of the data source but not
precisely as prescribed by the normative model of expectation maximation:
their decisions were too much influenced by data of low diagnostic value
(radicalism), and too little influenced by highly diagnostic value (conservatism),
Displaying tables of conditional probabilities of states of nature (amount
vendible) given the datum (P(H|D)) led to slightly better decisions (in the
sense of expectation maximation), than displaying probabilities of data given
states of nature (P(D|H)), or joint probabilities (P(D&H)). Another variable
studied was the shape of the conditional probability distribution (trapezoid
vs. a normal approximation).
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13. Domas, P. A. & Peterson, C. R. Probabilistic information
processing systems: Evaluation with conditionally dependent data.
Organizational Behavior and Human Performance. 1972, 7_, 77-85.
Previous research on Probabilistic Information Processing CPIP) systems
has used data that are conditionally independent. In the real .world, data
are frequently conditionally dependent, that is, given an hypothesis, the
occurrence of one datum influences the likelihood of occurrence of a second
datum. If the use of a PIP system is desired when the data are known to be
conditionally dependent, then it is necessary to know if PIP is an appropriate
system for the processing of dependent data. One experiment compared PIP with
a second system POP. PIP operators gave more optimal estimates when the data
were conditionally independent; however, POP estimators gave more optimal
estimates when the data were conditionally dependent. A second experiment attempted
unsuccessfully, to produce a modified PIP system that would give optimal estimates
for both conditionally dependent and conditionally independent data. A revised
technology of diagnostic information processing based on conditionally dependent
data was proposed.
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14. Wallsten, T. S. Conjoint-measurement framework for the study
of probabilistic information processing. Psycho!. Rev., 1972, 7£, 245-260.
Certain assumptions are invoked, implicitly or explicitly, whenever a
descriptive model of human processing of probabilistic information is built
around Bayes's rule. This paper shows that the two primary assumptions are
equivalent to a very general additive conjoint-measurement model. These plus
an additional assumption concerning the nature of sequential effects are then
proved to be equivalent to a distributive conjoint-measurement model, given a
certain task restriction. This allows the three assumptions to be tested with
ordinal data. It also provides a framework for the investigation of specific
theoretical problems concerning the nature and determinants of composition rules
and scale values. The notions of misperception, misaggregation, and response
bias currently discussed in the literature may be viewed as one subset of
those problems. This approach generates experiments of a sort not previously
done. One of them is presented herein. The basic model was not rejected
for most of the 12 subjects, and certain diagnostic properties demonstrated
how it failed for the others. In addition, specific relationships concerning
the scale values emerged. The paper concludes with a discussion of the
theoretical prospects resulting from this development.
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15. Youssef, Z. I. & Peterson, C. R. Intuitive cascaded
inferences. Organizational Behavior and Human Performance , in press.
Previous research has investigated the process by which people make
single-stage inferences, i.e., how they revise probability estimates about
hypotheses at one level as the result of observing data at an immediately
lower level. Such intuitive probability revisions usually turn out to be
conservative with respect to optimal performance. The present experiments
investigated the inferential process with two-stage inferences; it was
necessary to cascade information from Level 1 to Level 3 in a hierarchically
organized, probabilistic situation. The cascaded inferences turned out to
be systematically more excessive than corresponding noncascaded inferences.
The excessiveness was maintained as the data took on several different levels
of diagnostic value.
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16. Wheeler, G. E. Misaggregation versus response bias as
explanations for conservative inference. University of Michigan PhD
Thesis, 1972.
Recent research in human information processing has shown that most
subjects are conservative in making inferences from evidence. Conservative
inference is the process of extracting less than the optimal amount of certainty
from data. Several hypotheses have been proposed to explain conservatism, namely
misperception, misaggregation, and response bias.
Bayes's theorem provides the mathematically correct way of incorporating
data into an uncertain situation. The misperception hypothesis asserts that
people incorrectly perceive the impact of single data items, but use Bayes's
theorem to combine data; they do the right arithmetic with the wrong numbers.
The misaggregation hypothesis is that people correctly perceive the impact
of a single datum, but do not combine data correctly; they do the wrong
arithmetic with the right numbers. The response bias hypothesis, which has
several variations, asserts that:,over the range of values with which people are
familiar, they both perceive and aggregate data correctly, but outside that
range do neither very well. The experiments reported in this paper were designed
to test the various hypotheses, and in particular to compare misaggregation and
response bias predictions. Earlier research had indicated that misperception,
while certainly present under many conditions, was not the primary locus of
conservatism.
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In the present experiments, subjects made odds estimates about
which of two previously defined populations was being sampled. The two
populations were approximately normal.distributions. In Experiment I, d1
(the separation between the means of the distributions) was varied; subjects
responded to three different pairs of data generating populations. When
subjects were required to revise their odds over a sequence of data, they were
conservative, regardless of the size of the theoretically correct odds. Whe.n
they estimated odds for individual data, they were veridical, even when outside
the range that the response bias hypothesis would predict as veridical. Subjects
were sensitive to the diagnosticity of the data generating populations, and
responded appropriately to the different d1 values. The results were descriptive
both of median estimates and individual subjects' responses.
In Experiment II, the way of displaying the data generating populations
was varied, as was the way in which sequences were constructed. The results
indicated that neither of these parameters affected the way in which subjects
responded. In all conditions, subjects continued to display conservatism
when required to aggregate data, and to show veridicality when considering
individual data. As in Experiment I, the results were descriptive of
individuals' responses as well as of median estimates.
The results of this study indicate that although both misperception
and response biases exist, conservative inference may be primarily attributed
to misaggregation.
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17. Kelly, C. W., III. Application of Bayesian procedures to
hierarchical inferences. University of Michigan PhD thesis, 1972.
The state of knowledge required to solve an inductive inference
problem will often be partitioned so that it is difficult or impossible
to directly estimate likelihoods linking observable events and target
variables, i.e., data and hypotheses. For example, one state of knowledge,
£-j, might describe distributions involving a random variable, d,., and a second
state of knowledge, £«» "right describe distributions for a random variable,
h; but neither state is sufficient to calculate the joint distribution
{d.j,h}. In situations like this, states of knowledge can be combined to
yield {d..,h} if one or more variables ej, called intermediate or explanatory
variables, can be found such that {d^ ej. . .} e C-i and (ej . . .h} e £p-
Inferences which must incorporate one or more intermediate or
explanatory variables are called hierarchical, cascaded, or multi-stage
inferences. The work described herein is concerned with formulating a
normative model for hierarchical inference, investigating the theoretical
properties of the model, and applying the model to the solution of real world
inference problems.
The formulation begins by describing a series of hierarchical inferences
which arise in various situations. Structural or organizational properties
common to all these inferences are identified. It is shown that these structural
properties can be captured by modeling a hierarchical inference as an upper
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semi-lattice the nodes of which represent hypotheses, data and intermediate
variables. The edges of the graph describe statistical correlations which link
the data, intermediate variables and hypotheses. Drawing upon the Bayesian
concept of a probability as an orderly opinion, conditional probabilities are
associated with the edges of the graph and an algorithm is developed for solving
the general hierarchical problem.
Theoretical results are derived for a number of special cases of the
general model. Various analyses show how the impact of a datum entering a
hierarchical system is affected by the conditional probabilities, the number
of levels in the hierarchy, and symmetry conditions. The performance of the
optimal model is compared with that of two sub-optimal models in which one or more
or the inference makers in a hierarchy is assumed to operate in an information
reduction mode. In some cases, this does not result in as serious a loss of
performance as had been expected. In this vein, the performance of natural
hierarchical systems is also contrasted with that of the optimal model.
Several case studies are presented in which the model is used to solve
real world diagnosis problems. Since most of the problems are concerned
with unique or nearly unique events, considerable emphasis is placed on pro-
cedures for eliciting probabilities from relevant experts, A new procedure
based on the use of second-order probability density functions is developed and
techniques used to generate the inference tree or map the problem structure are
described. The case studies show that the use of hierarchical decomposition
is an aid in communicating and substantiating conclusions, encourages dialog
and establishes rules for debate.
